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Abstract This article will analyse the challenges facing CSDP through an evaluation 
of the impact that differing member state strategic cultures have on the EU Battlegroup 
Concept,, highlighted through the examples of Germany and Poland. The concept was 
initiated to give the EU an increased rapid reaction capacity. However, as emphasised 
through the cases of Germany and Poland, divergences in EU member states’ strategic 
cultures remain, including when, where and how force is used. When this is combined with 
the cost of plugging military capabilities’ gaps, the political willingness to deploy a 
Battlegroup can be affected. Whilst the article highlights that the role that member states 
want to play within CSDP as well as international expectations can override constraining 
factors, the Battlegroups rely on a rotation system. As some member states are more willing 
to deploy the Battlegroups than others, the concept risks becoming a declaratory policy thus 
undermining CSDP.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Battlegroup Concept was initiated in 2004, when the EU was trying to develop its role in 
the global security environment following divisions over the Iraq war. Building upon the 
Artemis mission, the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the European Capability Action 
Plan (ECAP) process, it sought to provide a value-added rapid reaction mechanism for 
military action, within the member states’ limited capabilities, whilst at the same time 
avoiding duplication with NATO’s reaction force. However divergences among the member 
states regarding CSDP including when, where and how force should be used, threat 
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perceptions and the role of multilateralism, encompassing Atlanticist and Europeanist visions 
for CSDP, also affect the Battlegroups. The concept therefore acts as a prism through which 
the challenges facing CSDP can be viewed.  
This paper will analyse member state attitudes to the Battlegroups through a focus on 
two neighbouring countries, Germany and Poland. In particular, the article assesses the 
impact that two different strategic cultures have on the Battlegroup Concept and in turn how 
this affects the overall development of CSDP. These divergences encompass when force is 
used, threat perceptions and multilateralism. Additionally there are also divergences between 
Germany, Poland and the EU level, such as where force is used. The article will highlight the 
implications these divergences have for the functioning of the Battlegroups and how this one 
concept highlights the overall problems within CSDP.  
Strategic culture will form the analytical foundation of the paper. It is particularly 
salient as it focuses on when, where and how force is used, which are central issues within 
the Battlegroup Concept. In particular a country’s strategic culture provides its policy-makers 
with a range of beliefs, attitudes and norms concerning what actions are appropriate within 
the security and defence field. This also informs the discussion concerning the potential 
emergence of a European strategic culture which encompasses how far member states’ 
strategic cultures are converging, highlighting that strategic culture can be subject to change. 
Indeed, both German and Polish approaches to security and defence issues have 
incrementally shifted, highlighting that aspects of their strategic cultures have come into 
conflict. This has placed pressure on both countries to play a more active role. The pressure 
to be more active, can also be highlighted through constraining and facilitating factors. These 
encompass international expectations, aspirations that the concept creates and financing. The 
former underlines the role that the international community expects a country to undertake 
and is particularly important in the German case due to the centrality of reflexive 
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multilateralism in German strategic culture. Whilst the international community has 
pressured Germany into taking on a greater role following the end of the Cold War, this has 
conflicted with the country’s restraints on the use of force. Aspirations to play a greater role 
are meanwhile particularly pertinent in the Polish case. In particular the Poles’ emphasis on 
being involved in decisions affecting their interests has overridden the country’s narrower 
security interests. Despite these pressures, financing acts as a constraint on what Germany 
and Poland can in reality achieve. Indeed the article will underline that those countries which 
are the most willing, such as Poland, are restricted militarily. 
Whilst this article could be seen as a purely academic exercise considering that the 
Battlegroups have not been used, it is argued that assessing where, in which circumstances 
and with which partners the Battlegroups should operate has important implications for the 
development of the EU as a security and defence actor. Thus does involvement in a concept 
such as the Battlegroups encourage member states such as Germany and Poland to take up a 
greater role than they otherwise would? If these issues do not correspond with German or 
Polish perceptions on the use of force, how will this impact upon their willingness to 
participate? Through interviews with Polish and German security and defence elites, it is 
possible to highlight the extent of each country’s participation in the Battlegroups and how 
far their strategic cultures have shifted to take account of the new security situation and their 
role within it. This includes such issues as deploying force outside of Europe, acting without 
a UN mandate, activeness regarding the use of force and views on the EU as an independent 
security actor, which ties in with their approaches towards multilateralism and Atlanticism.  
Finally, conclusions can be drawn regarding the development of CSDP, particularly 
concerning the limits of member states’ participation and consequently the restrictions placed 
on the EU’s role in the international environment. In particular the article concludes that a 
European strategic culture must be development further in order for the EU to become an 
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effective security actor. Indeed, whilst convergence between German and Polish strategic 
cultures has occurred, this still leads to a lowest common denominator strategic culture which 
is unable to provide guidance regarding military interventions abroad. This has led in part to 
the non-deployability of the Battlegroups and consequently has dented the EU’s effectiveness 
as a military actor.   
 
A EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURE? 
Strategic culture can be defined as the beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of force, 
held by a security community which has had a ‘unique historical experience’ (Gray 1999, 51-
52). Of particular importance, is the way in which historical experiences and memories are 
interpreted. As this differs from one country to the next, a strategic culture is distinctive to the 
society that holds it (Duffield 1998, 23; Gray 1999, 51). As historical experiences become 
embedded in society over a period of time, not least due to written records and 
commemorations, a strategic culture passes from one generation to the next making it highly 
stable (Longhurst 2004, 19; Wendt 1999, 163). Nonetheless, strategic culture sets the limits 
of the possible rather than acting as a tool by which to choose a hierarchy of choices for each 
set of circumstances. Therefore it shapes rather than determines a country’s security and 
defence policy. As such it fits into Gray’s premise that behaviour is an integral part of 
strategic culture in contrast to Johnston’s opposing rationalist view which highlights the 
breaking of the link between attitudes and behaviour to create a version of strategic culture 
which is falsifiable (Johnston 1995, 35-36; Gray 1999, 55). 
 Whilst continuity is stressed, strategic culture is not static. Change in strategic culture 
usually occurs in reaction to events in the external security environment, although this does 
not automatically happen due to the socialisation and thus institutionalisation of strategic 
culture. The most profound changes usually occur in reaction to war and conflict and lead to 
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the complete replacement of a society’s strategic culture as occurred in the case of Germany 
after the end of the Second World War. This is however extremely rare and instead the 
advent of new security conditions as seen with the end of the Cold War in 1989 or 9/11 will 
usually produce more moderate, gradual change (Longhurst 2004, 20). Indeed, whilst Polish 
and German strategic cultures have shifted, there is agreement on the main tenets of both 
countries’ security and defence aims across the political spectrum. 
 To what extent can an organisation such as the EU possess a strategic culture? 
Opinion is divided with Cornish and Edwards, Meyer and Reis suggesting that an EU 
strategic culture is beginning to emerge while Heiselberg, Rynning and Baun argue that there 
is not enough convergence at the EU level on the use of force to facilitate one (Baun 2005; 
Cornish and Edwards 2005; Heiselberg 2003; Meyer 2006; Reis 2009; Rynning 2003). 
Studies also differ in relation to whether they look at convergence and divergence between 
member states in order to ascertain if a European strategic culture is being created (Meyer 
2006) or whether they focus on the EU level (Toje 2005; Rogers 2009). This article sides 
with Meyer as CSDP is an intergovernmental area and thus it is the member states who 
decide whether to create a concept such as the Battlegroups or deploy troops abroad.  
However, a European strategic culture will not replace national cultures but will 
rather provide an additional layer. Whilst some convergence between national strategic 
cultures will be necessary, they do not have to be identical for a common position to occur. 
As Meyer (2006, 7) states ‘it should be conceived of primarily as the increasing 
institutionalisation of those ideas, norms and values that are sufficiently shared at the national 
level’. Therefore, member states must share common views regarding when (operational 
scenarios), where (location of EU operations) and how (multilateralism and the rule of law) 
the EU as an independent security actor uses force.  
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 Nonetheless, once the EU member states have decided upon political documents and 
military concepts, it is still of relevance to compare a country’s views on the use of force to 
these. In particular, it is one thing for a member state to sign up to a concept and another to 
enact it. This will also depend on whether a country has the ability (i.e. relevant military 
capabilities) to carry out the necessary military action, whether they are under pressure to 
contribute (international expectations) and how far the military action matches their own 
aspirations. Therefore German and Polish positions on when, where and how force should be 
used will be compared to the current ideas underlying the Battlegroup Concept. In addition, 
their military capabilities and the impact of international expectations and their own 
aspirations will also be covered. 
 
CASE STUDY SELECTION AND GERMAN AND POLISH STRATEGIC 
CULTURES 
At first sight the choice of Germany and Poland does not seem obvious. Nonetheless, 
it is argued that these two countries illuminate both the challenges of the Battlegroup Concept 
and that of the wider CSDP. Whilst the larger member states will shape the development of 
CSDP, it still requires agreement from a wider number of countries than the two military 
powers: France and the UK. In the context of an enlarged EU, this is particularly significant 
considering the differences in threat perception between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states 
which could impact upon when, where and how the EU uses force. In this respect a 
comparison between Germany, as an ‘old’ member state and Poland as a ‘new’ member state 
is illuminating. Although it is important to focus on larger member states as they have more 
opportunity to obstruct the Battlegroups due to their larger role and political clout, this 
dimension should also be taken into consideration. Additionally, it is important to concentrate 
on countries which have been under pressure to do more to participate and to take up 
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leadership roles. This is due to the fact that these types of countries are more likely to have a 
greater impact on the developing capabilities that CSDP and consequently the Battlegroups 
have at their disposal, than those countries which are already doing enough and are therefore 
not increasing their contributions. Evidently Germany and Poland fall into this former 
category. Indeed, many of the Battlegroups do not encompass either France or the UK. In 
other words, due to the rotating nature of the Battlegroups, it is essential that all member 
states have the ability and willingness to deploy. The concept also allows medium sized 
member states to come forward and take up a leadership role.  
In consideration of the above, this article looks at two larger member states which are 
playing leading military roles as Framework Nations in the EU Battlegroup Concept.  As the 
largest and most vocal new member state with an increasing role within CSDP and a 
Framework Nation for three Battlegroups, Poland is the obvious choice. Germany meanwhile 
co-introduced the Concept at the EU level and is one of the largest contributors.  Germany 
and Poland represent ‘more different’ cases in this article, in particular Poland’s recent 
membership of the EU in comparison to Germany’s original membership status, their 
differing views on when force is used and multilateralism as well as their economic size. 
Despite these differences, both Germany and Poland could have problems with the 
Battlegroups due to the challenges that the concept creates for their individual strategic 
cultures in addition to the potential lack of military capabilities. 
Germany’s strategic culture is historically represented by the concept of ‘Stunde Null’, 
which led to a feeling of ‘never again’ (Longhurst 2004, 46). This concept led to two further 
sentiments which came together to form the core of Germany’s strategic culture. First was the 
rejection of nationalism, which led to the country’s reflexive multilateralism. Second was the 
culture of restraint on the use of military force (Duffield 1994, 179). In relation to the former, 
reflexive multilateralism relates specifically to the integration of the country into western  
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security structures such as the EEC and NATO and placed an emphasis on working with 
partners and in coalitions by consensus. Additionally it encompasses Germany’s sowohl als 
auch policy of not choosing between its EU and NATO partners. Connected to this is an 
emphasis on working within multilateral frameworks and within international law, in addition 
to demonstrating reliability and predictability in foreign policy. 
This key element has however placed pressure on the country’s restrictions 
concerning the use of force. After the end of the Cold War the country’s allies asked that 
Germany ‘normalise’ its role in foreign affairs rather than continuing to engage in checkbook 
diplomacy. This has meant that a conflict has occurred between the country’s reflexive 
multilateralism and its culture of restraint on the use of force, which has resulted in a 
widening of the latter following in particular the massacre at Srebrenica. What has occurred 
since is an incremental shift in the country’s strategic culture towards deploying German 
forces out of area for humanitarian reasons.   
Meanwhile Poland’s strategic culture has been formed through its experience of 
heroic defeat and victim of Realpolitik, as evidenced at Yalta when Poland was deserted by 
its allies and placed under the Russian sphere of influence (Osica 2004a, 304-305). Thus at 
the core of the country’s strategic culture is the protection of Poland’s independence. This has 
led to the country’s instinctive Atlanticism as only the US through NATO’s Article Five 
could protect the Poles’ security, a proclivity to use force, being a reliable ally as well as an 
emphasis on ‘nothing about us without us’. This last point encompasses a central and vocal 
role in European decision-making.  Additionally the Poles are sceptical of multilateral 
institutions, which relates to the UN rather than the EU and NATO both of which were seen 
as the country’s ‘return to Europe’. Essentially the Poles are sceptical about the effective 
functioning of an organization which includes differing values within the Security Council 
(i.e. Russia) (Osica 2004b, 14).  
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As in the German case, Polish strategic culture has also seen incremental change. In 
particular, in order to be seen as a reliable ally and to be included in decisions affecting their 
interests, Polish policy-makers have had to widen their regional approach to security and 
commit to sending troops further afield, as seen in EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR 
CHAD/RCA. Additionally, the Poles also see this as a way to increase their influence in 
CSDP and as a political commitment. 
Poland and Germany represent differing views on some of the major issues 
concerning CSDP. Whilst Germany’s culture of restraint conditions the Germans’ strict 
parameters for the deployment of the Bundeswehr, which is reflected in the decision-making 
process, the Poles have a pro-active view on deploying force. However, the Poles’ pro-
Atlanticist orientation shapes its views concerning the tasks that CSDP should undertake, 
which also impacts on the Battlegroups. This is in slight contrast to Germany’s sowohl als 
auch policy. Finally Germany is a reflexive multilateralist and as such working with partners 
within the strict parameters of international law is essential. Poland meanwhile is sceptical 
regarding multilateralism, which impacts upon such issues as the necessity of a UN mandate.  
The two countries do however share a more regional view on where force could be 
used which has the potential to conflict with the Battlegroup Concept as the EU has a global 
security focus. For Germany, this relates to restrictions on the use of force and for Poland to 
their emphasis on the country’s independence which highlights threats closer to home. Thus, 
questions have to be asked concerning the likelihood of the Battlegroups acting within the 
new member states’ sphere of interest and how this is impacting upon declared commitments.  
 
INTRODUCING THE EU BATTLEGROUP CONCEPT 
The EU Battlegroup Concept was initiated at a joint Anglo-Franco summit at Le Touquet in 
February 2003 and fleshed out at a further joint summit in November 2003, following the 
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successful completion of the Artemis operation to the Congo. However, it was officially 
submitted as a UK, French and German initiative to the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) on 10 February 2004, after the then German Minister of Defence, Dr Peter Struck, 
expressed interest in the idea in informal talks at the Security conference in Munich. The 
concept was finalised at the military capability commitments conference on 22 November 
2004 and included in the Headline Goal 2010.  
The Battlegroup Concept aims on giving the EU a highly mobile set of forces, which 
are capable of rapid deployment. They are considered to be ‘the minimum militarily 
effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone 
operations’ (Council of the European Union 2007, 2). Each Battlegroup consists of 1500 
armed forces personnel, should be sustainable for at least 30 days, although it can be 
extended up to a maximum of 120 days and can be formed either unilaterally or 
multinationally. The exact composition of each Battlegroup is however up to the contributing 
member states. Nonetheless as Lindstrom (2007, 15) outlines ‘a ‘standard’ EU BG is likely to 
include a headquarters company, three infantry companies, and corresponding personnel’, 
which ‘may include mechanised infantry, combat support elements and combat service 
support elements’. The decision to launch an operation should be taken five days after the 
agreement by the Council and the operation should be deployed ten days after the decision by 
the EU. From 2005 until 1
st
 January 2007, the Battlegroup Concept was at initial operating 
capacity whereby only one Battlegroup was on standby at any one time. As of January 2007, 
the Battlegroups are at full operational capacity whereby two Battlegroups will be on standby 
and rotated every six months. Table 1 shows all the Battlegroups that have been committed 
by the member states from 2005 until 2015.  
The Battlegroup Concept is built upon three core activities: the Helsinki Process 
including ECAP, the successful Artemis mission to the Congo in 2003 and the ESS. ECAP 
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was launched so as to close the EU’s military capabilities’ gaps. Thus not only has the 
Battlegroup Concept filled a shortfall but it has also arranged a way in which troops and 
resources can be used and on call during specific periods. The Artemis Mission was utilised 
as a template to flesh out how the Battlegroups would work. Artemis involved the 
deployment of around 1800 primarily French troops, to Bunia in order to contribute to the 
stabilisation of security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation (Koivula 2005, 
16). Finally the ESS outlines the stance taken by the member states concerning inter alia 
threat perceptions, multilateralism and increasing capabilities. Thus it represents the political 
foundations of the Battlegroups as the concept will be based on this broad agreement.  
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
When should force be used? The EU is divided between those member states who have strict 
criteria on the use of force such as Germany and others who have a more pro-active approach 
which includes Poland. Germany’s culture of restraint has ensured that their focus is placed 
on a comprehensive approach to security encompassing primarily civilian aspects. In contrast 
Poland’s pro-active view on the use of force is based on a belief that the Poles should support 
their allies. However, this stance has to be tempered by the Poles’ ‘instinctive Atlanticism’ 
(Longhurst and Zaborowski 2003, 1010). Similar to many of the Central and East European 
Countries the Poles rely on NATO’s article five guarantee, underwritten by the Americans, 
for their security. Hence, it is essential that CSDP and NATO complement rather than 
conflict with one another.  
What tasks are the Battlegroups likely to undertake? The General Affairs and External 
Relations Council stated that the spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the 
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Treaty on the European Union ‘includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks 
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the 
ESS, this might also include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in 
combating terrorism and security sector reform’ (Council of the European Union 2004, 7). 
Clearly, the Petersberg Tasks in addition to new tasks as outlined in the ESS form the core 
missions for the Battlegroups. However, the missions have to be limited in scope as the 
Battlegroups can only be used for a short period of time and due to their size, only in certain 
situations. Indeed, this was the EU’s reasoning behind the rejection of the use of the 
Battlegroups in Congo in 2006 and Chad in 2008 (Chappell 2009). Therefore, the 
Battlegroups are to be used as an initial entry force, if necessary to be followed by a larger 
force either from the EU itself or another multilateral body such as the UN or NATO. As 
Andersen (2006, 25) emphasises, the Battlegroups ‘are driven by the underlying principle, 
“first force in, first force out” in humanitarian assistance missions and military crisis 
management tasks’. Alternatively they can be used as a bridging force to allow another 
organization e.g. the UN to regroup their forces or to refocus the mission.  
From the above, the types of missions the Battlegroups will undertake do not 
represent an insurmountable political obstacle to either Germany or Poland. First, the most 
likely tasks the Battlegroups will perform will initially not be too high in intensity. As 
Kerttunen (2005, 36) highlights ‘separation of belligerent parties by force is far too 
demanding’. From a German viewpoint they can only be used up to and including non-
permissive environments, whereby there might be some resistance from small rebel groups.
1
 
So, for those countries which have restrictions on the use of force such as Germany, 
participating in the Battlegroups appears feasible. Additionally these tasks do not conflict 
with the defence policies of Atlanticist countries such as Poland, which does not wish CSDP 
to encroach on article five tasks.  
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Both German and Polish decision-makers are keen to stress that CSDP’s added value 
lies in its holistic approach to security matters encompassing civil-military tasks. The former 
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Rotfeld has highlighted the possible usage of the 
Battlegroups in humanitarian interventions, concurring with Andersen’s point above. He 
stated that, ‘the European Union is establishing battle groups. The humanitarian disaster in 
South-East Asia points to the need for remodelling the concept of such groups, so that they 
will be able to deliver effective international relief in such crisis situations.’ (Rotfeld 2005, 
16). It is interesting that Rotfeld highlights remodelling the Battlegroup Concept in order so 
that they take on softer security tasks, which indicates the country’s preference for the EU to 
concentrate more on the civilian side so that it avoids conflicting with NATO’s security role. 
A similar view has also been articulated by the chairman of the EU Military Committee, 
French General Henri Bentegeat who is reported to have suggested that the Battlegroups 
should be used primarily for natural disasters (Czech News Agency 2009).  
Whilst the views of German and Polish policy-makers highlight a common approach 
regarding potential missions, the question remains as to whether the Battlegroups will end up 
carrying out operations at the lower end of the Petersberg Tasks due to member states’ 
restrictions regarding the use of force. Finding a consensus has already impacted upon what 
missions the EU is prepared to undertake within the CSDP framework. Considering the focus 
of Germany in particular, is on softer security aspects, the Battlegroups highlight that the 
same restrictions apply.  
 
WORKING WITH THE UN AND NATO 
From the tasks listed above, clearly the Battlegroups could work with other international 
organisations, in particular the UN and possibly NATO, reflecting the centrality of ‘effective 
multilateralism’ in the ESS. However Germany and Poland represent different perspectives 
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concerning multilateralism. Reflexive multilateralism is one of the keystones of Germany’s 
security and defence policy. Thus working with partners and international institutions in 
addition to only deploying force in a multilateral context, is of central importance to German 
policy-makers. In contrast, Poland is more sceptical of multilateral institutions with the 
exception of the EU in relation to non-military issues and NATO. Nonetheless Polish policy-
makers signed up to the ESS and their stance towards the UN has become more pragmatic. 
Although the Battlegroups are designed to work independently of organisations such 
as NATO, working with other multilateral institutions is envisaged depending on the tasks 
that the Battlegroups will carry out. Two issues stand out in regards to CSDP-UN 
cooperation. The first relates to how the Battlegroups would fit into an overall strategic 
framework in missions whereby the Battlegroups form one part of the mission. In relation to 
EU-UN cooperation involving the Battlegroups two scenarios can be envisaged: bridging 
operations by EU forces and the stand by model which would encompass an EU ‘over the 
horizon reserve’ or an ‘extraction force’ to support UN operations (European Council 2004, 
3-5). However the Battlegroups would then be contributing to UN missions, which highlights 
issues related to operational command (Gowan 2005, 16). Moreover, the EU could undertake 
missions independently with a UN mandate. Indeed, it does not necessarily have to be the UN 
who backs up or initiates the request for the Battlegroups. The EU could arguably work with 
other organisations such as NATO or respond to crises at the request of a nation state’s 
government. The same applies to the extension or take-over of a mission. Whilst this task has 
been connected with the UN, it is possible that NATO could fulfil this task too.  
Despite the differing importance of multilateralism in German and Polish foreign 
policy, working with the UN is seen by both as being worthwhile. Although German policy-
makers’ ensured that the Battlegroup Concept was re-focused away from being used 
primarily by the UN, they still see the organisation as central to international security. As the 
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German Minister of State Erler (2007, 2) emphasises, ‘the EU is currently studying the 
lessons learned from its Congo operation (…). These lessons are also of value to the EU 
Battlegroups (...) which can support above all the UN in crisis management’. From a Polish 
standpoint, whilst the country’s security is not so centred on multilateralism and the UN, it 
does still see the importance of the EU working with the UN, particularly considering that 
both organisations do possess some similarity of role in regards to crisis management and 
civilian engagement. However the UN is seen within the spectrum of international 
organisations, all of which have a role to play in international security.
2
  
The second issue relates to the necessity of a UN mandate as this is not specified in 
the Battlegroup Concept. Therefore, from the standpoint of the member states, is a UN 
mandate an absolute requirement for a Battlegroup mission? Again divisions occur between 
those member states who believe a UN mandate is essential and those who highlight time 
delays in addition to the potential subjugation of EU security and defence issues to non EU 
countries who are represented in the Security Council (Lindstrom 2007, 52). For the Poles, a 
UN mandate is not compulsory for action although as far as possible one should be obtained. 
Thus Poland’s decision-makers would be prepared to act without one, particularly if there is a 
responsibility to protect.
3
 Evidently in Germany, there are stricter criteria on when using 
force is permitted. Thus a UN mandate is almost a pre-requisite for action although there 
exists a very small possibility to act in the absence of one or at least to act in a wider 
interpretation of a mandate.
4
 However this refers to the evacuation of German citizens rather 
than for military action. Clearly, a UN mandate should be seen as a pre-requisite for ensuring 
action particularly due to the lack of time that the Bundestag would have to discuss and 
approve the deployment of a Battlegroup.  
Considering the number of Atlanticist countries within the EU, CSDP-NATO 
compatibility is essential. As the then Polish Prime Minister, Meller (2006, 7) stated, ‘we will 
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support the process of elaboration of the European Policy of Security and Defense, so as to 
make it complementary to the capabilities and resources of NATO. This applies, in particular, 
to the collaboration of NATO’s Response Force and the Union’s Battle Groups’. Essentially, 
Polish, in addition to German, decision-makers work from the assumption that they have one 
single set of forces and procedures. These should be developed to use in both the 
Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force (NRF) as neither country can afford different 
types of equipment or training standards in the context of static or declining defence budgets. 
As Lindstrom (2007, 25) underlines ‘planners recommend that EU BG contributors rely on 
already existing NATO standards and criteria to encourage interoperability and avoid 
duplication’. In a broader context, this relates also to all missions undertaken within CSDP 
and NATO frameworks. Additionally both German and Polish policy-makers realise that the 
Battlegroups cannot rely upon NATO assets. This is not only for political reasons but also 
due to the short timeframe available in which to deploy a Battlegroup. 
Despite differences between Europeanists and Atlanticists concerning how far EU and 
NATO should work together, this is not an issue in the Battlegroup Concept. First financing 
plays an intervening role in ensuring the centrality of CSDP-NATO compatibility. Second, 
Atlanticist countries such as Poland have accepted that CSDP can act independently of 
NATO as long as it does not unnecessarily duplicate equipment and tasks.  
 
THE LOCATION OF BATTLEGROUP OPERATIONS 
Where should CSDP operations more broadly and the Battlegroups specifically operate? The 
ESS encompasses a global focus which is also reflected in the report on its implementation. 
Whilst there is no kind of operational range for the Battlegroups in the Headline Goal 2010, 
there is a 6000km from Brussels planning assumption. The Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) for the Polish led Battlegroup states that the Battlegroup ‘will take part in operations 
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anywhere outside the EU with a planning assumption of 6000 km from Brussels or as 
otherwise defined in relevant EU BG documents’ (Memorandum of Understanding 2006, 9). 
Therefore 6,000km is not seen as the ultimate limit of the Battlegroups’ reach in the long 
term.  
To what extent do member states’ defence interests extend beyond Europe? Whilst 
there has been convergence between the member states concerning the EU’s role in the 
world, differences still exist regarding security interests and activism in military affairs. 
Looking at Poland and Germany, both countries’ policy-makers have a more regional focus 
for their security interests. Polish security fears tend to be focused on Russia, whilst 
Germany’s decision-makers are still wary when using force ‘out of area’ and so missions 
need to have a humanitarian element. Additionally, many of the new member states will form 
the EU’s border for a considerable time and therefore regional security is of utmost 
importance. This is combined with a continued suspicion over Russian intentions in the 
region (138
th
 Bergedorf Round Table 2007, 27).  
Whilst for both German and Polish decision-makers, missions on the European 
continent are clearly in their country’s security interests, this is not so obvious in Africa. 
Indeed, Germany’s security and defence elites were originally concerned that the Battlegroup 
Concept would only be used in Africa. At the same time, the value of the concept was 
understood and they therefore refocused the concept so that it could be used for all crises and 
conflicts.
5
 This reflects German concerns that other member states are using CSDP as a way 
of sharing their colonial responsibilities both financially and politically.
6
  
These German concerns can clearly be highlighted in the debate concerning the 
country’s participation in EUFOR RD Congo. Menon highlights that, ‘during discussions of 
the deployment to the DRC in 2006, German officials voiced their fear of being 
‘instrumentalized’ by their French and Belgian colleagues’ (Menon 2009, 240-241). This was 
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underlined by the fact that the request came from Guéhenno, the head of the UN 
peacekeeping department and a French diplomat and circumvented normal procedures, 
leading to German concerns that this was a French rather than a UN request (Gross 2009, 
150; Alecu de Flers, Chappell and Müller 2011, 16).  Indeed some policy makers as well as 
the public find it difficult to understand why the Bundeswehr should go to Africa, which cuts 
across party lines.
7
 This is also a reflection on the Germans’ restrictions on the use of force. 
Therefore, as Ryjáĉek (2009, 495) states ‘the government found itself with two dilemmas: 
first between the positions in favour and against; and second between domestic constraints 
and international commitments’. 
 Initially the use of a Battlegroup had been suggested by the French. However, as the 
Germans would be left to pay for the majority of the mission due to the “costs lie where they 
fall” principle in addition to issues such as it was not a rapid reaction operation and the 
Battlegroup in any case could not fulfil the mission remit, the Germans declined (Alecu de 
Flers, Chappell, Müller 2011, 16-17). Nonetheless, in the end the Germans’ effective 
multilateralism pushed the boundaries of its restraints on the use of force and the country, 
under pressure from France, became the Framework Nation for the EU mission which was 
eventually sent. Therefore as Alecu de Flers, Chappell and Müller (2011, 18) state ‘German 
leadership in EUFOR RD Congo can be seen as Germany taking its turn to ensure the 
ongoing development of the ESDP and to support attached concepts such as ‘effective 
multilateralism’ rather than an increasing interest in Africa’. This is highlighted by the fact 
that Germany only contributed four officers to the OHQ in the next African mission, EUFOR 
RD Chad/RCA. 
For its part, Poland’s policy-makers wish the country to play the role of 'a good 
European', showing solidarity to other European countries which do have interests in the 
region. Polish decision-makers  also saw participating in missions outside their security 
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interests as a political investment as CSDP could be needed for possible contingencies and so 
there is a need to build a link for reciprocity.
8
 However the EU’s concentration on Sub-
Saharan Africa for CSDP missions has also led to the Polish Undersecretary of State for 
Defence Policy Komorowski calling for CSDP to be made ‘more geographically balanced’ 
(Komorowski 2008, 4). Thus the Poles want to ensure that the EU does not forget about other 
regions closer to home. This is because the security situation in Eastern Europe directly 
impacts on the Polish security situation and reflects Polish threat perceptions which are 
concentrated on the neighbourhood.  
Nonetheless, the Poles have continued to support and contribute to the EU 
Battlegroup Concept for a couple of reasons which link to the country’s strategic culture. 
First Poland’s emphasis on nothing about us without us has involved a willingness to be 
actively involved in the Battlegroups. In particular, Polish policy-makers expect that if the 
country is active in regions incorporating other countries’ security interests then they are 
more likely to reciprocate when a problem occurs in Eastern Europe (Alecu de Flers, 
Chappell, Müller 2011, 19). In this respect, Polish policy-makers can have a greater influence 
on the development of CSDP if they actively participate in it. Second Polish policy-makers 
wanted to prove the country’s predictability in security and defence matters, particular in 
contrast to its unpredictability in other areas of the EU, which occurred under the Kaczyński 
leadership. These two aspects have overridden the Poles’ regional security approach which is 
based on the country’s threat perceptions.  
 Evidently, there is a division between member states such as Germany and Poland, 
who would prefer CSDP to operate primarily in Europe and Eurasia and the broad security 
interests of the EU as set out in the ESS. Indeed it should be noted that Germany, along with 
the UK, once again rejected a Battlegroup deployment to the Eastern Congo at the end of 
2008. One of the reasons behind this was the reluctance to engage troops in Africa, mirroring 
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German concerns in 2006 as highlighted above (Menon 2009, 236). Thus such divisions 
which can be seen within CSDP in general, clearly have implications for the Battlegroups. 
FINANCING DEPLOYMENT 
Whilst political issues often take centre stage when deciding on a mission, intervening factors 
must not be forgotten. Financing in particular can act as a constraint to action. In the 
Battlegroup Concept this relates specifically to getting the Battlegroup to the theatre of 
operations, primarily through strategic airlift due to the strict deployment timeline. The 
French, German, British ‘food for thought’ paper states that ‘member states offering BGs will 
need to ensure that their bid includes appropriate strategic lift assets, pre-identified, 
earmarked and available to meet the 15-day target’ (France, Germany, UK 2004, 3). In 
relation to strategic lift, ‘up to 200 C130/30 C17 (outsized) aircraft sorties for initial 
deployment to a central African theatre’ would be required (France, Germany, UK 2004, 4).  
The EU as a whole suffers from a lack of strategic airlift, which is essential if the 
Battlegroups are to be deployed in the time allotted. Poland has acquired six C-130s as part of 
the financial package for the F-16s, the first of which arrived last year. This will improve 
Poland’s strategic airlift capability although evidently it falls far short of what is required to 
deploy a Battlegroup. A number of member states, including Germany have ordered the 
A400M which has been beset with problems. It is so severely delayed that the German 
Federal Ministry of Defence even considered whether to cancel its order (Spiegel Online 
2009).
9
 However, the A400M does not necessarily plug the EU’s strategic airlift gap as it 
only holds 29 metric tons. Andersson suggests that to deploy a Battlegroup with 30 days of 
supplies ‘would require the transportation of around 150 standard size containers of 
equipment and stores with a combined weight of somewhere between 1,500 and 3,600 metric 
tons’ depending on whether water is included or not (Andersson 2006, 29; See also Kerttunen 
2005). Nonetheless, the conditions on the ground also have to be taken into consideration. 
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This includes whether there is a runway long enough to land large transport planes, near to 
the location of the operation. In this respect the A400M is useful as it needs a shorter runway 
than air transport planes such as the AN-124 and the C-17 (see Lindstrom 2007, 34).  
Additionally the creation of a European Air Transport Fleet, which Germany is 
participating in, has been announced. This will concentrate on pooling aircraft such as the 
A400M and the C-130, although the effectiveness of such a fleet without the pool of A400Ms 
has to be questioned. Another option is to use the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), 
in which Ukrainian AN-124-100 Condor planes are rented out for a set number of hours. A 
number of EU countries are part of this initiative including Poland and Germany. Finally 
Poland is participating in the Multinational Strategic Airlift Capability which has been 
developed by NATO in which 3 C-17s have been jointly purchased. The C-17s are based at 
Papa Airbase in Hungary and have thus far been used to support ISAF and the Kosovo 
mission in addition to providing humanitarian relief in Haiti (NATO 2010).
10
 In addition to 
NATO missions, the C-17s could be used for UN or EU operations.  
There are two problems with these types of initiatives. First is the question as to 
whether the flying hours and the planes themselves will be available when required for a 
Battlegroup mission. Second is the cost of actually leasing aircraft. As Menon (2009, 239) 
states ‘the cost to the UK Exchequer of leasing four C-17s from Boeing has been put at 
$200,000 per aircraft, whilst that of a single Antonov flight to Afghanistan as part of ISAF is 
around $250,000’ (see also Lindstrom 2007, 35; Jacoby and Jones 2008, 337) . The costs put 
leasing arrangements beyond many member states.  
In consideration of the costs involved, will the member states be prepared to 
participate and/or pay for a mission? Currently missions are funded through ‘common costs’ 
and through the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle, which are borne directly by the member 
states. The former are funded through the Athena mechanism and member states contribute to 
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this depending on their gross national income. Hence Germany, which funds 20.97% of the 
common costs, is the largest contributor, whilst Poland, which puts in 2.21%, is tenth (EU 
Council Secretariat 2006, 5). Another issue concerns Battlegroup transport costs as these 
were previously considered as common costs (Menon 2009, 239). Thus for poorer member 
states such as Poland this made participating in the Battlegroup Concept financially easier as 
the burden of strategic transport was lessened.
11
 The question was therefore whether those 
countries which pay a higher share of the common costs and are not participating in a 
Battlegroup mission would be prepared to use the Battlegroups as opposed to ad hoc 
arrangements. Nonetheless, in relation to the potential use of the Nordic Battlegroup for the 
Chad mission in 2008, Jacoby and Jones (2008, 332) underline that ‘the Swedish political 
leadership may have quietly signalled that they could not afford a deployment. As the lead 
nation, and without a common EU budget to tap, the huge costs of deployment to Chad ‘lay 
where they fall’, which was to say on Sweden’. If Sweden could not afford to deploy the 
Nordic Battlegroup under this arrangement it is difficult to see how poor member states such 
as Poland will be able to deploy under the new rules in which transport costs are no longer 
seen as common. In this sense the actual conundrum is that those member states that are 
willing to deploy are in fact financially unable to do so.  
 
DECLARED COMMITMENTS 
Considering the divergences among the member states concerning where and when a 
Battlegroup should be used, how has this impacted upon their declared commitments to the 
concept? From Table 1, it appears that the member states are committed to the concept. 25 
out of 27 member states in addition to possibly five non-EU countries are participating and 
all slots up until the first half of 2012 have been filled. By far the largest contributors are 
Germany and France who are participating in nine and ten Battlegroups respectively. 
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Interestingly 11 and possibly 12 member states have also agreed to be Framework Nation 
(FN) for the Battlegroups, highlighting the concept’s usefulness in expanding the number of 
countries who are willing and capable of undertaking a leadership role beyond the large 
member states.  
This is assisted by the fact that Battlegroups can be formed multinationally. Therefore 
for a country such as Poland becoming an FN for a multinational Battlegroup represents a 
compromise between two extremes: to form their own Battlegroup or to join another FN. 
However as Kawałowski underlines the creation of a national Battlegroup ‘will be worth 
considering in the future as it will follow the transformation process of the Polish military 
forces, the implementation of conclusions of strategic defence reports, as well as operational 
experience (Iraq, Afghanistan, DR Congo)’ (Kawałowski 2007, 53-54).12 Clearly though, 
Polish transformation is occurring whilst working in conjunction with other countries in the 
Battlegroup concept in addition to NATO as this enables the Polish armed forces to identify 
‘capability areas that need to be developed. These include for instance CIS, NBC, ISTAR and 
strategic lift’ (Gągor 2007, 2). Indeed Polish officials see cooperation between countries as 
positive in respect to the Battlegroups.
13
 
Meanwhile, for German policy-makers, the country is holding up the flag of 
multinationalism, particularly by working with small countries and assisting Poland in its 
Framework Nation role. Essentially German decision-makers have made sure that those small 
countries that want to take part can do. Originally they worked on a 2 + 1 principle whereby a 
Battlegroup would be made up of two large member states and one small one.
14
 Evidently 
this criterion has widened, considering that Germany is taking part in Battlegroups 
comprising of five countries. This highlights the centrality of multilateralism in German 
strategic culture, reflected by the fact that the country will not deploy force unilaterally, even 
if operating within a multinational organisation such as the EU. Whilst the Battlegroup 
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Concept might challenge certain aspects of Germany’s security and defence policy, 
particularly the constraints on the use of force, it allows the Germans to fulfil other central 
features, not least working with partners. This highlights the conflict that is taking place 
within German foreign policy between the Germans’ strict definition on the use of force and 
the importance of their reflexive multilateralism.  
To demonstrate how the Battlegroups encompass multilateralism as well as assisting 
countries to participate or act as leader, the Polish led Battlegroup in 2010 presents an 
interesting case as other participating countries will act as ‘lead nation’ for certain elements 
of it. Poland, as the FN are contributing 50% of the Battlegroup, including about 750 troops 
and ‘a core element based on a motorised infantry battalion with necessary organic combat 
and combat service support elements. The FN will also provide the core of the (F)HQ and a 
command support unit to this HQ’ (Memorandum of Understanding 2006, 11; The Warsaw 
Voice 2006). In preparation for the standby period, Poland’s 1st Motorised Battalion in 
Miedzyrzecze received combat readiness evaluation of Land HQs and Units (CREVAL) 
certification in December 2008 (The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Poland 
2008). Interestingly, this Battalion has had operational experience in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Terlikowski 2010, 1).  Other tasks that the Poles have undertaken, include 
establishing the (F)HQ and providing the Force Commander, co-ordinating the training and 
preparation of the Battlegroup and chairing the manning conference to agree upon the 
manning and organisational structure of the (F)HQ and the (BG) HQ staff (Memorandum of 
Understanding 2006, 11-16).  
Germany meanwhile is providing about 30% of the Battlegroup strength, comprising 
around 500 troops and is acting as ‘lead nation’ for logistic support coordinating this for both 
the Battlegroup and the Force HQ. Moreover, the country is taking the lead in terms of 
medical support and commanding the Multinational Medical Task Force, which the Germans 
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and Poles will establish (Memorandum of Understanding 2006, 13-15). The Battlegroup is 
also utilising the German OHQ at Potsdam as Poland does not possess one. Slovakia is 
supplying 200 troops and is taking on the role of ‘lead nation’ for the supply of engineering 
resources (Memorandum of Understanding 2006, 14). Lithuania is contributing 200 personnel 
including, infantrymen, logistics, medicine and military police elements in addition to 
possibly providing some transportation, through flying hours it plans to buy using the C-17 
initiative (Baltic News Service 2006). Finally Latvia is providing 60 troops (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia 2006). Thus there is a division of labour concerning 
what each country is providing, with Poland contributing half the troops necessary and 
Germany backing Poland up with logistic support.  
 
CREATING ASPIRATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
Clearly, the Battlegroup Concept has the potential to be a driver for capability development and 
for making the armed forces of member states more capable of undertaking rapid long-range 
deployments (Williams 2006, 2). Thus the Battlegroups create and/or fulfil expectations and 
ambitions which can override more narrowly conceived security and defence policies. As 
Jacoby and Jones (2008, 333) underline in the case of Sweden, ‘the EU BG concepts gave 
specific shape and form to an important national ambition’. Additionally the Battlegroups are 
partly based on permanent structured cooperation, which politically pressurises the member 
states therefore acting as a catalyst for further cooperation.
15
 Whilst participation is voluntary, 
peer pressure compels member states to want to be included rather than to be left on the 
sidelines. This raises the question as to how far a country’s threat perceptions, views on the 
use of force and financial considerations act as a constraint on their participation.  
For the Poles, the importance of being able to participate in decisions affecting their 
interests in security matters means that Polish policy-makers are looking to play a key role in 
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CSDP. This has spilt over into the Battlegroup Concept as the Poles’ wish to take on a pro-
active role whilst also improving the country’s capabilities. Due to Poland’s policy-makers’ 
work towards the country’s NRF contribution, becoming a FN for the Polish, German, 
Latvian, Lithuanian and Slovak Battlegroup did not pose too many problems as the structure, 
units and procedures are similar, although the Battlegroup Concept ‘also stimulates the 
development and modernisation of Polish armed forces’ (Kawałowski 2007, 54).16 This can 
be seen with a number of military development issues which have arisen in Poland in regards 
to the potential Visegrad Four (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) + Ukraine 
Battlegroup. Whilst Poland has been invited to be the FN for the group, the country’s 
decision-makers will have to think about operational command and whether there are enough 
transport capabilities, including strategic airlift, in order to go ahead. Another issue is 
whether Poland should acquire an EU rapid reaction OHQ.  
How far the Battlegroup Concept creates aspirations and subsequently change 
depends on the extent to which the concept fits with the country’s overall perceived role 
within CSDP, a point which Jacoby and Jones (2008, 325) have highlighted in the case of 
Sweden. For a country such as Poland who wishes to be seen as a constructive, active 
participant, the Battlegroups provide an important platform. This highlights the importance of 
a country’s strategic culture which is instrumental in shaping what role a country should play 
on the international stage.  
Additionally international expectations have to be taken into consideration. In 
Germany’s case this is particularly pertinent considering the emphasis that the Germans place 
on multilateralism. Clearly German policy-makers have looked to shape the Battlegroup 
Concept politically which coincides with their traditional motor role within the EU. However 
they have also come under pressure from their partners to assume a greater role militarily. 
Thus the Battlegroups are a useful tool which allows the Germans to declare a greater 
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military responsibility. This is reflected not only in the number of Battlegroups that Germany 
is participating in but also in their role as FN. Thus intervening factors such as international 
expectations and the role the Battlegroups play in promoting military development need to be 
taken into consideration when assessing the potential impact of divergences between the 
member states regarding the Battlegroup Concept. 
 
POLITICAL WILLINGNESS  
Despite the declared political and military commitment to the Battlegroups they have yet to 
be deployed. Therefore, are the member states actually prepared to deploy their Battlegroups 
wherever in the world they are needed? Whilst divergences between member states on key 
issues such as threat perceptions and where and when force is used has not necessarily 
impacted upon declared commitments, some member states appear reluctant to use the 
Battlegroups. The most obvious example of this concerns the use of a Battlegroup in eastern 
Congo to support the UN which came up for discussion in the second half of 2008. UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had requested a temporary EU bridging mission and the 
French had subsequently suggested the use of the Battlegroups. However as previously 
stated, this proposal was rejected by the UK and Germany both of whom were acting as 
Framework Nations for the two Battlegroups on standby at the time. As Menon (2009, 236) 
states in the case of Germany, ‘opposition to intervention stemmed from a reluctance to send 
troops to Africa, coupled with growing suspicions that German troops were being used as 
‘cover’ by certain partners to legitimize intervention in their former colonies’. Thus German 
concerns seem to be focused on where force is used which reflects their restrictions on the 
use of force and connected to this, the necessity of getting two thirds of the Bundestag to 
agree to any deployment.  
  28  
For other countries, such as Poland it is clear that the political willingness does exist 
as other domestic factors override threat perceptions and where force should be used in an 
EU context. Indeed, Witney has described Poland as ‘a “go to” player in European defence – 
always ready to contribute, whether to a new operation or a new collaboration (…) its 
determination to achieve front-rank status in defence is palpable’ (Witney 2008, 24). Polish 
decision-makers’ emphasis on ‘nothing about us without us’ has guaranteed Polish 
participation in CSDP missions and projects so as to ensure that their opinions are taken into 
account. Thus despite having no immediate defence interests in Africa, the Poles contributed 
150 armed forces personnel to EUFOR Congo and 400 personnel to EUFOR TCHAD/RCA 
making the country the third and joint second largest contributor respectively. Although the 
Poles want to ensure that CSDP is also active in eastern Europe, as previously stated, this has 
not prevented them from being active in other parts of the world.  
 Further evidence of German and Polish policy-makers’ willingness to use the 
Battlegroups can be highlighted through their opinions concerning the alteration of the 
concept to make it more usable. This came up for discussion in the latter half of 2009, when 
the Swedish Presidency placed the issue of the Battlegroups’ usability onto the agenda. In 
particular, they proposed that the concept should be more flexible. Thus a Battlegroup or 
parts of a Battlegroup could be borrowed for operations such as EUFOR Chad/RCA. 
Evidently it would be up to the contributing countries of each Battlegroup to decide whether 
to allow their Battlegroup to be used in this way. German and Polish decision-makers have 
opposing views on this (Chappell 2009). The Germans have agreed not ‘to block the 
initiatives of those who hope to allocate their Battlegroups to purposes other than those set 
out in the current concept’ (Agence Europe 2009) which implies that they do not want to see 
the Battlegroups used for tasks other than rapid reaction operations. Meanwhile the Poles 
support the idea of making the Battlegroups more usable. As Terlikowski (2010, 2) highlights 
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‘during its own presidency, Poland should consider initiating work on an overall 
improvement of the mechanisms to generate military forces for CSDP missions, including the 
rationalization of the battle groups system’. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has evaluated how two different member states’ strategic cultures have impacted 
upon their perceptions of and commitment to the EU Battlegroup Concept. In particular, two 
major dividing lines in CSDP have been identified: the use of force, encompassing a 
country’s threat perceptions and atlanticism vs. europeanism. German and Polish perceptions 
of these key factors have then been used to assess the extent to which they impact upon the 
EU Battlegroups. This has therefore enabled an in-depth analysis into where conflict between 
German and Polish strategic cultures and the Battlegroup Concept lie and to what extent these 
can be overcome. 
In summary, divisions between europeanists and atlanticists have not impacted upon 
the concept. This is due to the fact that even strong atlanticists such as the Poles realise that 
the Battlegroups are qualitatively and quantitatively different from the NRF and that the EU 
should be able to play an independent although complementary role to NATO, focusing on 
civil-military aspects, which the Germans also concur with due to their restrictions on the use 
of force. This highlights that there is an increasing convergence between the member states 
concerning the fact that the EU should be able to play an independent role, within the context 
of international law, using the full range of capabilities up to and including military force. 
Meanwhile the conflict between the Germans’ culture of restraint and its effective 
multilateralism has meant that the country has widened the boundaries concerning when force 
can be used. Finally, both countries are restricted financially and thus compatibility between 
EU and NATO standards is essential. 
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However the divergences which remain should not be underplayed. Member states’ 
threat perceptions which impact upon where force should be used combined with the 
financial cost of deploying the Battlegroups affects the effectiveness of the Battlegroup 
Concept. Although the concept allows a country such as Germany to back up their political 
leadership role with concrete military commitment whilst at the same time demonstrating the 
country’s multilateral credentials, the willingness to deploy has been missing. In other words, 
whilst international expectations have placed pressure on the Germans’ restrictions on the use 
of force, due to the centrality of multilateralism in the country’s strategic culture, this has 
only caused an incremental shift concerning when and where Germany uses force. Therefore, 
whilst German policy-makers will take their turn to deploy the Bundeswehr in CSDP 
operations in Africa, this has not resulted in increasing enthusiasm to send troops there. It is 
this African connection which has resulted in the Germans’ reluctance to deploy the 
Battlegroups.   
What is interesting, however, is that the Poles’ similar view concerning where force is 
used, which is based on the country’s regional threat perceptions, has not restricted the 
country’s activism further afield. Thus, what might have appeared to be a similarity between 
German and Polish strategic cultures has turned out not to be the case. This is due to the 
relative strength in the Germans’ restrictions on the use of force in comparison to the relative 
weakness of Poland’s regional view when it comes into conflict with other aspects of its 
strategic culture. In particular this concerns ‘nothing about us without us’ in which Poland 
should be involved in decisions affecting the country’s interests and the importance the 
Poles’ place on being a reliable ally. This has led to Polish policy-makers increasing 
willingness to participate in CSDP and the desire to hold a leadership role. In this respect the 
Battlegroups have enabled this to take place in addition to acting as a catalyst for military 
development.  
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Evidently, there has been some convergence between German and Polish strategic 
cultures. This encompasses the Germans’ increased activism in using force out of area and 
the broadening of Polish security interests combined with an agreement that the EU should be 
an independent security actor, particularly in the civil-military field, as long as it does not 
duplicate NATO. More specifically to the Battlegroup Concept, the atlanticist-europeanist 
dimension does not come into play due to the rapid reaction nature of the Battlegroups.  
However this does not result in a fully fledged strategic culture which would offer a 
framework concerning the EU’s use of military force and thus provide a foundation for the 
use of the Battlegroups. Therefore whether a Battlegroup is deployed or not will depend on 
whether it is in each participating member states’ interest to do so. In this respect whilst the 
Battlegroups were created to provide additional usable rapid reaction capabilities and to avoid 
the need for ad hoc force generation processes, they have not overcome the political 
willingness hurdles. Consequently, the continued failure of the EU’s member states to agree 
on precisely when, where and how the EU uses force could not only spell the end of the 
Battlegroup Concept but could also undermine the EU’s international reputation as a security 
provider.  
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Table 1 – EU Battlegroup Commitment Roster from 2005-201517 
Standby Period Contributing member states Point of Contact
18
 
Previous Battlegroups   
2005/I 1. UK 
2. France 
1. UK 
2. France 
2005/II 1. Italy 1. Italy 
2006/I 1. Germany, France 
2.Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece 
1. Germany 
2. Spain 
2006/II 1. France, Germany, Belgium 1. France 
2007/I 1. Germany, Netherlands, Finland 
2. France, Belgium 
1. Germany 
2. France 
2007/II 1. Italy, Hungary, Slovenia 
2. Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria 
1. Italy 
2. Greece 
2008/I 1. Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Norway, Ireland 
2. Spain, France, Germany 
1. Sweden 
2. Spain 
2008/II 1. Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, 
Luxembourg 
2. UK 
1. Germany 
 
2. UK 
2009/I 1. Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece 
2.  Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania 
1. Italy 
2. Greece 
2009/II 1. Czech Republic, Slovakia 
2. Belgium, France, Luxembourg 
1. Czech Republic 
2. Belgium 
Current Battlegroups   
2010/I 1. Poland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia 
2. UK, Netherlands 
1. Poland 
2. UK 
Future Battlegroups – 
Firm Commitments 
  
2010/II 1. Italy, Romania, Turkey 
2 Spain, France, Portugal 
1. Italy 
2. Spain 
2011/I 1. Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Austria, 
Lithuania 
2. Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia and Ireland 
1. Netherlands 
 
2. Sweden 
Future Battlegroups - 
Commitments 
  
2011/II 1. Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania 
2.Portugal, Spain, France, Italy 
1. Greece 
2. France or Portugal 
2012/I 1. France, Belgium Luxembourg 
2. Vacant 
1. France 
2012/II 1. Italy, Slovenia, Hungary  1. Italy 
  41  
2. Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia, 
FYR Macedonia and possibly Ireland 
2. Germany 
2013/I 1. Poland, Germany, France 
2. Vacant 
1. Poland 
Future Battlegroups – 
Initial Offers 
  
2013/II 1. UK, Sweden 
2. Belgium, Luxembourg tbc – possibly France 
1. UK 
2. Belgium  
2014/I 1. Greece and tbc. Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus 
2. Vacant  
1. Greece (tbc) 
2015 Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
possibly Ukraine  
 
 
                                                     
1
 Confidential interview conducted by the author with a German civil servant, Berlin, 2007 
2
 Confidential interview conducted by the author with a Polish civil servant, Warsaw, 2007 
3
 Confidential interviews conducted by the author with Polish civil servants in Brussels and Warsaw, 2006 and 
2007 
4
 Confidential interview conducted by the author with a German civil servant, Berlin, 2006. 
5
 Confidential interviews conducted by the author with a researcher and a former high ranking civil servant, 
Berlin, 2006 
6
 Confidential interview conducted by the author with a researcher and former civil servant, Berlin, 2006 
7
 Confidential interviews conducted with German party officials, Berlin, 2007. 
8
 Confidential interview conducted by the author with a researcher, Warsaw, 2007 
9
 Along with the 60 planes that Germany has ordered, France has ordered 50, Spain 27, the UK 25, Turkey 10 
and Belgium 8 – one of which is on behalf of Luxembourg. 
10
 Participating countries include Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia and the US as well as two non-NATO members – Finland and Sweden. 
11
 Confidential interview conducted by the author with a Polish civil servant, Warsaw, 2007 
12
 The original states ‘będzie wart rozważenia w przyszłości, w miarę postępowania procesu transformacji Sił 
Zbrojnych RP, implementacji wniosków strategicznego przeglądu obronnego oraz doświadczeń operacyjnych 
(Irak, Afganistan, DR Konga).  
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13
 Confidential interview conducted by the author with Polish civil servants, Warsaw, 2007. 
14
 Confidential interview conducted by the author with a German civil servant, Berlin, 2007 
15
 Confidential interviews conducted by the author with an official in the Council of the European Union, 
Brussels 2007 and a researcher, Warsaw, 2007. 
16
 In the original it reads ‘Pobudza też rozwój i modernizację naszych sił zbrojnych’.  
17
 The information used to compile this table was taken from Niklas Granholm, Niklas, ´EU-Battlegroups Some 
New Capabilities, Actually´, RUSI Journal, 151/6, (2006), p66; Nico Neesen, ´Das Einsatzfuehrungskommando 
der Bundeswehr als strategisches Hauptquartier der EU´, Europaeische Sicherheit, Vol. 11, 2005, p39; Council 
of the European Union, EU Battle Groups Offers and Commitments (EU BG Roster), 14337/05, 11 November 
2005, Brussels, p2; Gustav Lindstrom, Gustav, Enter the EU Battlegroups, p88; The Irish Times, Government 
weighs up transferring to new EU Battlegroup, 28 July 2008; European Union Military Committee, BG Update 
and the EUMC Report to PSC on the Outcome of BGCC 2/08, Brussels, 28 October 2008, 14833/08 Ext 1, p3 
and European Union Military Committee, BG Update and the EUMC Report to PSC on the Outcome of BGCC 
1/09, Brussels, 29 April 2009, 9244/09 Ext 1, p3. 
18
 The point of contact does not have to correspond to the Framework Nation for each Battlegroup, although in 
most cases it does.  
